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Abstract          
 
“Alarm fatigue” is a top priority in many hospitals because it can cause dangerous, potentially 
life-threatening situations. This project focuses on the causes of and responses to the high 
numbers of telemetrically initiated alarms in a cardiac care unit at the UMass Memorial 
Medical Center. Lean methods tailored for hospitals are utilized to assess current state 
conditions, identify root causes, propose target conditions, and develop and effect an 
implementation plan. After implementation, the unit experienced a 13% reduction in total 
paged alarms over the post-design change period compared with the data preceding 
implementation of target state design. There was a 38% reduction in the number of the two 
specific telemetry paged alarm types targeted in this project over the sample period. 
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Chapter 1: Client, Problem, and Approach 
Client Statement  
The client is a cardiac telemetry unit, called 3 East, at the University campus of the UMass Memorial 
Medical Center (UMMHC). The problem is the lack of response to alarms received in the telemetry 
unit due in part to the number of alarms, but also due to various system design features. The system 
being studied consists of 3 East’s telemetry hardware and software, the nurses, PCAs, nurse 
educator, and nurse manager who work in the unit and who monitor a maximum of 24 patients 
through telemetry,  and the policies and procedures for responding to telemetry alarms. The 
objective of this MQP is to redesign this system using lean methods so that all “Sp02 no sensor” and 
“ECG leads off” alarms are handled in a clinically acceptable period of time.  Background information 
is provided below about the client, the problem, and the approach taken to address the problem. 
The Client 
The UMass Memorial Medical Center, located in Worcester, Massachusetts, is a three-campus, 
nonprofit healthcare network which serves as the teaching hospital for the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School. In 2012, for the second consecutive year, UMass has been rated the 
number one hospital in Worcester County by U.S. News Best Regional Hospital rankings. The 700 bed 
hospital system, the largest in Central and Western Massachusetts, treats thousands of patients daily 
and is “committed to improving the health of the people of our diverse communities of Central New 
England through culturally sensitive excellence in clinical care, service, teaching and research” 
(http://www.umassmemorial.org/clinton-hospital/about-clinton-hospital/mission-vision-and-values).  
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The University Campus houses 417 licensed acute care beds with clinical focuses on radiation 
therapy, cancer care, neurology, trauma care, psychiatry, surgery, and advanced cardiovascular care 
in the Cardiac Care Laboratory. The Children’s Medical Center, a pediatric specialty center, is located 
at this campus as well, and has Central Massachusetts’ only pediatric ICU. This campus is also home 
to LifeFlight, the first air based ambulance in New England, as well as the region’s only Level I trauma 
center. Every year over 110,000 patients are treated in the Duddie Mass Emergency and Trauma 
Center. In 2010 the campus opened an Ambulatory Care Center that offers care through clinics and 
translational research programs.  More information is available at the following link:  
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_255.pdf 
Because so many of the patients reside in either acute care or in Intensive Care Units (ICU), constant 
monitoring of patients’ medical conditions is necessary. Many patients in acute care are monitored 
through telemetry by recommendation of a physician, and all ICU patients are watched through 
bedside units. All employees of the medical center seek to provide the best patient care possible, and 
because of this, the existing alarming model is in place. 
The Problem 
A major problem with the current system is that the sheer number of alarms is so large that nurses, 
who are responsible for responding to the alarms, have become overwhelmed by the volume of 
noise. On the patient care floors there is constant noise that has led to a condition known as “alarm 
fatigue.” The medical center’s mission is to provide the best possible experience for the patients, and 
noise is the number one complaint of admitted patients. 
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The primary goal of this project is to reduce the number of nuisance and false alarms in order to 
restore the urgency initially intended to be created by the alarm. To do so, research into the current 
alarm system, including investigation of parameters, policies, work flow, and limitations of the 
equipment, was conducted.  
This project specifically addressed the problem of high volume and long response times to 
telemetrically generated ECG (electrocardiograph) and SpO2 (pulse oximeter) alarms and their 
contribution to subsequent high volume of alarms caused by alarm repeat.  Alarms are paged to both 
nurses and personal care assistants (PCAs) within the cardiac unit (3 East floor in this study) with no 
specific individuals accountable for response to the alarm.  In addition, there was not a known way to 
silence the alarms from within the patients’ rooms meaning that alarms would still be generated 
even when the patient was being attended to by a nurse or PCA.  Although personnel could be 
responding to a patient whose telemetry pack had generated an alarm, they would still need to 
return to the patient information center (PIC) to silence the alarm.  As a result, unnecessary or 
redundant alarms are generated and sometimes alarms are not addressed in a timely manner.  
Boundary/Scope  
The focus for this project was located at the 3 East cardiac floor of the University Campus of UMass 
Memorial Health Care and involved a maximum of 24 telemetry packs and the associated nurses, 
PCAs, nurse educator, and nurse manager. The specific types of alarms that were studied were ECG 
“leads off” and SpO2 “no signal”.  Discussion among members of an executive steering committee 
that was formed to address the problem resulted in a determination that the project should involve 
only telemetry units and there would be no change of physiologic parameters allowed.  Management 
participated in the selection of the particular unit, 3 East on the University campus, which was 
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selected because Mary Buttitta, the Nurse Manager of the unit, expressed interest in involving her 
staff with the project. 
The Approach 
The approach used in this project is lean methods based on a process known as the A3 report format, 
which is shown in Appendix A.  Root cause analysis (RCA), which focuses on identifying all elements 
that contribute to the problem, is a component of the A3 report process. The client also incorporates 
the plan-do-study-act (PDSA) method as part of their A3 report format. Using these tools and 
processes, including working with the front line staff, an understanding of flaws with the system and 
current practices was developed. Input from Philips, the manufacturer and creator of the alarm 
system, telemetry units, and bedside units was used to further understand underlying contributors to 
alarm fatigue.  
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Chapter 2: Background Literature 
This chapter provides background and context on technology and the terminology associated with 
the project. Topics covered include telemetry, an overview of alarm fatigue with associated hazards 
and patient satisfaction issues, and an explanation of how Lean Methods have been integrated into 
the healthcare industry.  Case studies are included which provide background into how two 
institutions addressed alarm systems management.  
Telemetry 
Telemetry is used in intermediate care units which include cardiac, surgical, neurological, and 
respiratory care units. In these intermediate care units the goal is to provide optimal care while 
requiring less expensive technology and lower nurse-to-patient ratio than in the ICU units. Prior to 
the development of telemetry, any and all patients who required monitoring had to be admitted to 
ICUs. The mobility of telemetry packs is important for post-surgical patients in intermediate care 
units who, for the most part, tend to be relatively mobile so constant portable monitoring is 
necessary.  The physiological purpose of telemetry units is to monitor the electrocardiograms (ECG) 
and the saturation of peripheral oxygen (SpO2) in the body. ECG signals and SpO2 values are captured 
and transmitted via the telemetry pack. This data is then processed and displayed on the central 
monitor operation system, otherwise known as the patient information center (PIC). The PIC 
generates alarms and recordings which are used to notify and inform clinicians of changes in the 
patient’s conditions.   
Constant monitoring of ECG signals and SpO2 values is crucial.  SpO2 levels are measured with pulse 
oximeter devices that are connected by a cable to telemetry packs; the device is a sensor that can be 
placed on any thin, translucent part of a patient’s body. Typically sensors are placed on fingertips or 
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earlobes, with two light-emitting diodes (LEDS) one with a wavelength of 660nm and the other 905-
940nm, that shine through the skin to a photodiode. The absorption of the wavelength differs 
between oxyhemoglobin (Hb02) and deoxyhemoglobin (Hb) and their ratio can be calculated from 
the absorption ratio of the two LED lights. From the following formula SpO2 is calculated. 
 
Knowledge of a patient’s SpO2 level is important because it provides a “fifth vital sign”, in addition to 
blood pressure, temperature, pulse, and respiratory rate.  An SpO2 of greater than 95% is generally 
considered to be normal. When saturation level decreases below 92% this suggests hypoxemia. 
Patients with known respiratory illness or breathing difficulty may need to be put on oxygen 
supplementation if their SpO2 rate falls below 92%. Pulse oximetry is valuable in triaging potentially 
hypoxic patients to determine which patients should have arterial blood gas measurement. Alarms 
are triggered from the telemetry pack when SpO2 rate falls below the set parameters of the system 
or when a signal is no longer being read.  
ECG signals have similar value to SpO2 alarms with respect to patient monitoring ability. An ECG is a 
measurement over time of the net electrical activity of the heart muscle, as recorded at the body 
surface by electrodes attached to the skin, and is measured in several directions simultaneously. By 
interpreting the electrical currents of the heart throughout a series of heartbeats, from several 
angles, much can be determined about the functioning of a patient’s heart. For recording data, graph 
paper is dragged past a marker hooked to the measurement device of the electrical current at a fixed 
rate leaving a graph of the net electrical current between two electrodes. (Pullen, 2011)  
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Willem Einthoven, born in 1860, was a physician, mathematician, physiologist, and also the first 
person to transmit ECG signals over a telephone line. Known as the “Father of Electrocardiography,” 
he developed the string galvanometer that enabled producing the first high-quality images and 
identified wave forms and described the mathematical relationship between leads I, II and III 
(Hannibal, 2011).  This is known as Einthoven’s triangle and was the basis for the three electrode 
system used more than 30 years until the development of the twelve lead ECG.  The trend in the last 
decade has been to use continuous monitoring of the 12 lead ECG with reduced lead sets so that 
ischemic (insufficient blood supply) patterns can be identified quickly (Hannibal, 2011).    
Alarm Fatigue 
Alarms on medical devices are intended to alert caregivers of hazardous conditions and potential 
problems, but when subject to too many alarms the caregiver may become a victim of alarm fatigue. 
This can result in errors due to omission, distraction, or inattention to alarms and patients in need. 
The definition of alarm fatigue has not yet become standardized, but at the Clinical Alarm Summit 
hosted by the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) in 2011, 
representatives from AAMI, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Joint Commission 
(TJC), the American College of Clinical Engineering (ACCE), and the Emergency Care Research 
Institution (ECRI) conversed together to address the multiple interpretations. The most common 
definition of alarm fatigue is when a caregiver is overwhelmed with 350 or more alarms per patient 
per day (Welch, 2012).   
Another aspect of alarm fatigue is what it means relative to patients who are unable to rest because 
of the magnitude of the alarm signals within audible range.  It is also considered alarm fatigue when 
true life-threatening alarm events are not addressed because caregivers do not respond. This 
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happens when a caregiver is unable to distinguish a critical or high priority alarm over the noise of 
competing alarms.   
In 2012 ECRI published a Top 10 Health Technology Hazards list, upon which alarm hazards was 
ranked number one (Welch, 2012). The article summarized a variety of factors that result in alarm-
related adverse incidents.  For example, when caregivers become overwhelmed with the number and 
sounds produced by alarms their chances of being desensitized increases and they are more likely to 
have a delay in their response to the alarms. Alarm desensitization is a result of high false alarm rate, 
lack of alarm standardization, and the number of medical devices that produce alarms. Studies have 
shown that 80-99% of alarms are false and/or clinically insignificant.  Many devices generate false 
alarms, which causes distraction and interferes with clinicians performing critical tasks. In some cases 
staff may attempt to reduce the number of alarms by improperly adjusting alarm limits or reducing 
the volume of the alarms.  Such actions may cause the conditions and events not to be properly 
captured or alarms to be ignored because they were unable to be heard. When caregivers are unable 
to distinguish the source or level of urgency of an alarm they may also not be able to respond in a 
timely manner.  
Alarm-related incidents may also occur when the alarms have not been restored to the active setting 
after patients have been put on standby. Other causes of incidents include: alarms not being properly 
relayed to ancillary notification systems potentially resulting in a failure to notify staff, lack of alarm-
notification and response protocols, and failure to promptly correct leads-off alarms or other 
frequent nuisance alarms caused by “artifact.”  Artifact is the term for inaccurate analysis of the ECG, 
resulting in false alarms caused by noise in the signal being sent by electrodes.  Causes of artifact or 
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noise include:  increased resistance to electrode conductivity resulting from buildup of skin oils, dried 
or smeared electrode gel, or wrong brand of electrode for telemetry device. Other causes are poor 
electrode contact with the skin due to poor preparation, sweating, pulling on the cables, or muscle 
movement. (Wheaton Franciscan Healthcare Self-Learning Packet – Telemetry Monitoring) 
The 2012 ECRI article also highlights recommendations for addressing alarm hazards, with the central 
theme being a recommendation for an in-depth assessment of an organization as a whole as well as 
each individual care area. This is because trying to fix isolated problems in one area may cause more 
problems in different areas. It is important to establish protocols for the alarm-system settings that 
are customized for the specific care unit based on the types of conditions being monitored. Protocols 
for caregivers to tailor alarm limits to individual patients should also be put into place to ensure staff 
are notified of any clinically significant alarms. Alarm notifications and response protocols that 
ensure each alarm will be recognized and responded to by the appropriate caregiver should also be 
established. It should be clear who is responsible for recognizing and responding to which alarms.   
The solution to reducing alarm fatigue is through alarm management which involves the proactive 
focus on the culture, staff responsibilities, technology, policies, procedures, processes, and other 
factors and tasks that are required to created efficient alarm verification, notification, response, and 
documentation. Alarm management policies are important in defining alarm accountability as well.  
Attention to reduction of alarm fatigue through alarm management has been of interest for a 
number of years.  In 2006 the Health Care Technology Foundation (HTF) conducted a survey of 
clinical alarm issues with responses from nurses and other staff in hospitals with acute care. In 2011 
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they conducted the same survey again with 3,454 complete responses.  More than three quarters of 
the responders held eleven or more years’ experience in the healthcare industry. 
One question asked participants to rank nine issues concerning alarms, with a ranking of 1 as most 
important and 9 as least important. As shown in Figure1, one third (33.3%) of the responses 
indicated frequent false alarms as the number one issue. The 2011 version of the 
 
Figure 1: Health Care Technology Foundation Survey 2011 
survey included additional questions regarding clinical alarms and changes. The results of one 
question showed that 18% of hospitals had experienced adverse patient events between 2009 and 
2011, with nearly half of the participants unsure if events had occurred. A second new question 
asked if their institution had developed clinical alarm improvement over the same two years, with 
results that indicated only 20% had and nearly half were unaware. In the 2011 version of the survey, 
data were collected to determine the percentage of hospitals that have employed monitor watchers, 
of which 47% reported they do. Other key statistics regarding nuisance alarms from the 2011 survey 
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are: 75% of participants agree or strongly agree that nuisance alarms occur frequently, 70% of 
participants agree or strongly agree that nuisance alarms disrupt patient care, and 78% of 
participants agree or strongly agree that nuisance alarms reduce trust in alarms and cause caregivers 
to inappropriately turn off alarms.  
The first recommendation made in regards to the results of the survey was to reduce nuisance 
alarms.  All stakeholders including manufactures, clinicians, healthcare leadership, government 
agencies, and clinical engineering must be involved in a systematic approach to address the 
complexities of clinical alarm issues. Education regarding adverse events was shown to be lacking as 
well as knowledge of improvements in alarm safety, leading to a recommendation to improve 
communication. Also the priority of clinical alarm improvements needs to be raised. Another 
suggestion was the utilization of monitor watchers as a form of central alarm management.  
Between 2005 and 2008 over 550 deaths nationwide were reported through the FDA’s Manufacture 
and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) database related to alarms on monitoring devices, with 
216 deaths total during 2005-2010 related to alarms on bedside and telemetry monitors alone. The 
MAUDE database reveals that over a period of four months during 2010 there were 73 alarm-related 
deaths reported, with 33 having been caused by physiologic monitors. It was not until 2010 that an 
unfortunate incident spurred national attention to alarm hazards. In January of 2010, a patient at 
Massachusetts General Hospital suffered an untimely death due to alarm fatigue. The patient was 
awaiting the implant of a pacemaker when his heart rate began to fall.  His bedside monitors’ 
alarming had been silenced the previous night, as a consequence, nurses were not notified of the 
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patient’s plummeting heart rate. After twenty-three minutes, a nurse discovered the unresponsive 
patient when conducting her routine rounds.  
Over the course of 4 years, UMass Memorial Medical Center has had two deaths that were caused by 
alarm fatigue. The first occurred in 2007 when a patient’s alarms indicating the battery needed to be 
replaced were not answered. The woman suffered from cardiac arrest, but because her monitor had 
stopped working no alarm was generated and the event went unnoticed. A second case of alarm-
related death occurred on 2011 when a patient who was restless and constantly removing sensors 
had a severe increase in heart and respiratory rate and decrease in blood oxygen level. For 
approximately an hour the patient’s monitor generated alarms until a final critical alarm sounded 
indicating that he had stopped breathing. The nurse assigned to this patient claimed that she was 
updating medical records and assumed someone else had been responding to the alarms. When she 
finally responded to the critical alarm the patient needed cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), but 
ultimately the patient suffered brain injury due to lack of oxygen and was withdrawn from life 
support.  
Patient satisfaction is also a concern for institutions. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
recommends noise levels in hospitals not exceed 35 decibels during day-time hours and 30 decibels 
in the evening, as it can present occupational hazards or hinder patient recovery. A study conducted 
with 75 pieces of medical equipment illustrated how 54% of the equipment had a fixed alarm sound 
that exceeded 70 decibels. The multitude of these loud alarms is bothersome to patients especially 
during the evening.  Surveys conducted with patients pre-discharge have shown that one of the top 
complaints is too much noise.      
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Case Studies    
The following two case studies described here illustrate how lean methods can be used to design 
solutions to the alarm fatigue problem. The first is a white paper entitled, “Using Data to Drive Alarm 
System Improvement Efforts” which describes the efforts undertaken at Johns Hopkins to better 
understand and then to implement change to better manage their alarm systems (Using Data to 
Drive Alarm System Improvement Efforts - The Johns Hopkins Hospital Experience, 2012). 
Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, MD is a 1050 bed teaching hospital that undertook several 
major initiatives beginning in 2006 to address hazardous situations related to alarm systems.  
Prompted by several adverse patient events, a program to improve alarm system management was 
put into action. With data from this effort, the severity of the alarm fatigue problem became 
apparent. At one point the alarm data collected averaged 350 alarm conditions per bed per day.    
The first challenge faced by the task force established to address the alarm system problem was to 
learn how to analyze the data. According to Maria Cvach, assistant director of nursing, clinical 
standards, “It took us two years to figure out how to extract the right data.” Andrew Currie, director 
of clinical engineering, headed up a safety effort working with a “comprehensive unit-based safety 
program” (CUSP) team and began studying data. They set up a “real-time surveillance system to 
integrate data feeds at the bedside from multiple medical devices” in an ICU unit based on an in-
house system and data from commercial components. Although the number of alarms was huge, 
patterns of alarm conditions began to emerge which showed that many were clearly false. A patient 
safety expert teamed with Cvach, Currie and the task force began to tackle the problem on several 
fronts. 
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A first goal was to eliminate as many nuisance alarm conditions as possible by focusing on alarm 
parameters. This led to an investigation of the default setting for alarms.  Adjustments were made 
unit by unit, in all monitored units, to levels that would only signal a call to action. This allowed 
advisory alarms to be subordinated and present visual signals only instead of auditory alarms that 
contributed to the noise. By working with unit leadership, they were able to guide staff through a 
process that evaluated and prioritized alarm conditions, one by one, unit by unit. Profiles were 
created for different patient types to determine, in conjunction with monitor vendors, how to fine 
tune the settings.   With the metrics that had been established by data analysis, the team was able to 
compare the results of the modest changes that had been made. An initial 30% reduction in alarm 
conditions resulting from changes made with unit management participation helped motivate broad 
buy-in.  
In addition, new types of technology were tried, and changes in monitoring practice were evaluated. 
New electrodes leads were tested. Hallway waveform displays with split screens were tried. In-room 
monitors allowing caregivers to view other patient’s data were tried along with pagers to provide 
closed-loop communications and escalation of alarm conditions to backup caregivers.  A centralized 
monitor watch program with trained operators to watch waveform units 24 x 7 and alert caregivers 
was evaluated. This approach was not rolled out hospital-wide due to high expense and lack of 
conclusive data supporting improved effectiveness versus other methods. According to Cvach, no 
one technology works well in every unit across the hospital and few of the technologies are perfect.” 
In conclusion, the initiative has been successful. The hospital has experienced a 43% reduction in high 
priority alarm conditions over an 18-day period, a 24-74% reduction in alarm conditions in 6 Intensive 
 15 
 
Care and Intermediate Care units, and a 47% reduction in total alarm conditions per bed per day in 
two pilot units. What began as a task force intended for a short time has evolved into a hospital-
wide, continuing effort with monthly meeting of the Alarms Management Committee six years later. 
In 2012 this committee became a medical board subcommittee.  A major factor in the success of this 
initiative was the effort made to share the goal with clinical unit managers once the data was 
available in a meaningful context. Another key component was investing the time to fully understand 
all aspects of the alarm condition events in terms of equipment, patient and staff. By taking 
incremental steps to design and effect change, only after unit management had participated in the 
decision process, risk of adverse outcomes and resistance to the process were mitigated, if not 
eliminated. New training programs on alarm systems for staff were also important.  While all these 
indicators point to improvement, there are still too many alarm conditions and a need to develop 
better multi-parameter, predictive monitoring systems rather than focus on reducing critical (those 
intended to save a patient from demise) alarm condition numbers. 
The second case study entitled, “Plan, Do, Check, Act: Using Action Research to Manage Alarm 
Systems, Signals, and Responses” details the process undertaken at Beth Israel to address their alarm 
system challenges (Plan, Do, Check, Act: Using Action Research to Manage Alarm Systems, Signals, 
and Responses, 2012). 
 
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center is a 631-bed teaching hospital of the Harvard Medical 
School with two campuses in addition to clinical partnerships with other institutions. After two 
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sentinel events1 in patient rooms at their Boston Campus, investigation revealed “inconsistent 
cardiac telemetry alarm system management.”  Two different types of alarm signals were involved in 
these specific events: one was physiological (ventricular tachycardia) and the other technical (leads 
off).  For both events there was delayed response to the alarms, the first because the alarm was 
sounded in a room distant to the central station and was not heard, and the second alarm, leads off, 
was treated by responders as not very significant because of the high frequency of these types of 
alarms.  
A multidisciplinary team formed to investigate the events quickly identified some simple steps to be 
taken such as synchronizing all the clocks involved in the monitoring system: devices, displays , and 
wall clocks. Other measures for improvement were determined after an intense month-long 
assessment. It was learned that 40 to 50% of patients in general medical and surgery units were 
being monitored by cardiac telemetry. In one cardiac unit alone “more than 1,200 cardiac auditory 
alarm signals from the unit’s 32 telemetry beside monitors” were generated in a 24-hour period. In 
addition, there were other devices creating alarm signals that were also adding to the noise.  
An evaluation of cardiac alarm technology was undertaken using Failure Mode Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), now widely used in the healthcare industry. The Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
defines    FMEA as a “systematic proactive method for evaluating a process to identify where and 
how it might fail and to assess the relative impact of different failures, in order to identify the parts 
of the process that are in the most need of change.”2  At Beth Israel Deaconess, a thorough step-by-
                                                          
1“Sentinel Event” A term for a ‘headliner’ event that may cause an unexpected or unanticipated outcome, death or 
serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof. Source: 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/patientsafety/toolkit/joint commrcascopehospitals.pdf 
2 http://www.ihi.org/knowledge/Pages/Tools/FailureModesandEffectsAnalysisTool.aspx 
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step process to reveal potential failures or mistakes and identify possible consequences 
complements the lean objective of focusing on value to the customer (patient). It was observed that 
criteria for placing patients on cardiac telemetry monitoring was inconsistent.  There was a sense 
that placing patients on cardiac monitoring was improving their safety when in fact it was not really 
true.  Increasingly sophisticated equipment was being deployed with “more bells and whistles” 
without evidence that patient safety was improved.  The training for cardiac monitoring given nurses 
was also found to be inconsistent. 
One step taken was to standardize default alarm parameter settings on all the devices used in all 
units while still allowing staff to make individual adjustments for some patients. Additionally, some 
alarm conditions were eliminated altogether. According to Pat Folcarelli, director of patient safety, “If 
we look at those 1,200 alarm conditions, a significant percentage of them weren’t contributing at all 
to any clinical significance. We suppressed them from being able to alarm.”  A second step taken was 
to change the way staff dealt with alarms. They assigned a nurse or patient care assistant to be the 
“primary alarm responder” to assure continuous monitoring. This individual’s role was to be 
responsible for resolving technical alarms such as leads off or no signal conditions. The intent was to 
reduce repeat alarms and help alleviate background noise.      
For the long term, Beth Israel established a telemetry task force which now guides decisions 
concerning “alarm system management standards, guidelines, and equipment upgrades.” The team, 
composed of physicians, clinical engineers, nurses, healthcare quality, facilities, and supply 
management staff, initiated an upgrade of all cardiac monitoring equipment. Visual marquees are 
now located in the hallways of all patient units. A comprehensive, multi-year equipment upgrade 
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program for the medical center is now underway.  In 2012, all telemetry monitors, including 
hardware and software, and central monitoring stations were replaced. The hospital is working with 
vendors to tailor alarm conditions to its institutional preferences. 
As Tricia Bourie, cardiology nurse manager and chair of the telemetry task force stated, “A leads-off 
technical alarm condition in this institution is treated as urgently as a high-priority physiological 
alarm condition and yet our equipment still treats it like a low-priority alarm condition.”  Leads-off 
alarms are shown on the marquees but the audible alarm signal indicates low priority.  They are also 
paying closer attention to determining when to place monitors on patients so that the opportunity 
for false or unnecessary alarms is reduced.  
Cardiac monitor leads were also evaluated to determine if there was a better ECG electrode product 
that could be used. After trying different lead products on different floors, a change was made to use 
new electrodes that would adhere better to patients’ skin while still providing comfort.  
Training was upgraded to help better manage alarm response in cardiac units. According to Bourie, 
“There’s 24-7 coverage of the monitoring by a trained telemetry technician who can respond to 
alarm conditions…and actually go to the patient bedside and put leads on, replace batteries, and 
perhaps be a first responder to a code event.” This specialty role, not commonly used in the area, 
was developed at the hospital. 
Results achieved by Beth Israel include: 30% decrease in alarm signals, reduced response time to 
critical alarm signals (45 seconds down to 10-15 seconds), and a decrease in the response to leads-off 
alarms from an average of more than 3 minutes to an average of between 1 and 2 minutes. Changes 
also include annual telemetry competency training for all nurses, defined goals and responsibilities 
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for alarm signal response, standardized volume levels for auditory signals, and a focus on best 
practices. Through a focused, consistent, multidisciplinary approach to addressing the alarm fatigue 
problem, Beth Israel has created a culture of action for auditing their standard of patient care and 
outcomes with respect to alarm systems management and clinical practice. As Bourie says, “It hasn’t 
always been this way. We are more consistent with our approach and metrics so we know if we’ve 
made a difference.” They are now expanding their efforts beyond cardiac alarm systems to include 
other medical technology with alarms.   
The Johns Hopkins and Beth Israel case studies reveal that the entire system of patient monitoring, 
not just the alarms, requires systematic methods for understanding and identifying factors that 
contribute to, or cause alarm fatigue. This includes: data capture and analysis, understanding the 
technologies’ capabilities and limitations, training and responsibilities of personnel, appreciating that 
requirements differ by department, and that a multi-disciplinary team will likely be required to 
monitor effectiveness and progress over time. In this project at UMMHC, management decided to 
focus specifically on two types of nuisance alarms in one department. This low risk approach allows 
for potential benefits to be identified without causing disruption or distraction to multiple 
departments.          
Lean Methods in Healthcare   
In the past decade the healthcare industry has undergone significant changes. Healthcare costs and 
the need for treatment have increased while the number of staff and the level of patient satisfaction 
have decreased. Many of the issues in hospitals, including alarm fatigue, are the result of, or are 
made worse by, inefficient work systems. Healthcare leaders, in particular hospital executives, are 
applying many processes and techniques, including lean process analysis tools in a variety of ways to 
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become more efficient.3 Lean is a method used to identify the errors, or waste in processes, and then 
correct or remove them. Lean techniques can be used to strike a balance between efficient use of 
resources and patient satisfaction, and still be fiscally responsible. The various quality improvement 
initiatives use systematic problem-solving techniques to design sustainable changes for systems. The 
end goal of applying these principles is to design a system that has only value added activities, 
“referring to those tasks that cause the product or service to advance to a more complete stage” 
(Carriera, 2006). All non-value added work should be minimized or eliminated. Any non-value added 
work wastes resources, including time and money.  
The roots of what is now called lean process improvement originated with the Toyota Motor 
Corporation’s Toyota Production System (TPS). In the early 1950s the company began administering 
Training Within Industry Courses (TWI) to improve quality and productivity while also reducing cost. 
The renewed importance of these programs came with the boom in the automotive industry when 
mass production and standardization of parts first became possible. Continued development of these 
principles and techniques has led to the application of lean principles, not only in manufacturing, but 
in all processes. 
A first step in understanding lean improvement is to “understand value as defined by our customers. 
In clinical care delivery, external customers include patients, families, payers, and regulators. Internal 
customers include physicians, nurses, clerks, and others involved in the care process” (Lim, 2006) 
Within the context of this MQP project, value can be regarded as fewer nuisance alarms for care 
                                                          
3 For an overview of quality improvement methodologies see The Intersection of Evidence-Based Practice With 5 
Quality Improvement Methodologies. Seidl, Kristin L. PhD, RN; Newhouse, Robin P. PhD, RN, NEA-BC, FAAN Journal 
of Nursing Administration. 42(6):299-304, June 2012. 
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givers to cope with coupled with reduced possibility of sentinel events for patients as a consequence 
of alarm fatigue.   
Lean management philosophy has ties to other models of quality improvement such as W.E. 
Deming’s total quality improvement (TQM)/continuous quality improvement, and Six Sigma which 
was developed by Motorola and General Electric (Kim, 2006).  Although there are overlapping ideas 
and techniques, the value stream approach to effect change and eliminate waste within the process 
of providing products (services) for customers distinguishes lean from the others.  Unique to the 
concept of lean are the ideas of value from the customer’s perspective and the discovery and 
description of waste. Lean uses specific tools to help transform waste into value. A lean approach 
motivates people to “learn to see” their product or service process flow and thus help to identify 
examples of waste with the goal of creating products and services with built-in quality and minimized 
waste (Kim, 2006).  
“In a lean organization, everyone is responsible and accountable for integrating lean thinking 
principles, methodologies, and tools into daily work” (Kimsey, 2010).   
Many examples of lean projects are documented in the literature with some institutions having 
conducted dozens of lean projects over a span of years. For example, in an article entitled “Impact of 
5 Years of Lean Six Sigma in a University Medical Center,” Gerard Niemeijer, et al document 
experiences of the Netherlands second largest hospital, the University Medical; Center Groningen 
(Niemeijer, 2012). In the period from September 2007 through December 2011 this institution 
conducted 163 official Lean Six Sigma projects. In their experience with the lean projects it was noted 
that “related problems in different sectors or departments were very similar, with often-similar 
solutions as well” (Niemeijer, 2012). They also noted that in order for projects to be successful the 
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scope must be limited to the organizational scope of the champion. Their conclusion notes that 
engagement of leadership is essential for success of projects.  
While lean methods are now routinely applied in diverse settings, implementing lean principles in the 
hospital environment can prove challenging. Hospitals are composed of individual units; each 
specialized with a different focus. It is common that not all units will have the same processes 
because of their various disciplines. This presents a problem for system-wide implementation of any 
solutions that were successful in one unit. Additional planning and communication between 
departments, along with commitment to the lean project, may be required to improve efficiency.  
Many organizations and companies now have departments specifically dedicated to improving 
effectiveness and efficiency in processes. The UMMHC has a new department called the Center for 
Innovation and Transformational Change (CITC) that is focused on the improvement of hospital 
processes and operations. Staff members in this department implement lean techniques to address 
various design flaws and inefficiencies in the hospitals’ processes.  To ensure improvement initiatives 
are successful a multidisciplinary team that represents all stakeholders is required.   
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
This chapter provides an explanation of the standard documents, processes, and procedures that our 
client, UMMC, employs to address problems or conditions identified. These steps are used for work 
on the topic of this project because as part of their mission statement, UMass Memorial Medical 
Center is committed to “Effecting change through teamwork and system thinking”, an example of 
which is the Process Improvement Charter: Clinical Alarm Management and Distribution (Appendix 
B).  One specific item in this charter is to “Decrease the total number of non-actionable nuisance and 
false alarms.”  
This MQP was initiated to fulfill parts of this alarm management charter.  UMMC’s recently formed 
Center for Innovation and Transformational Change works with various units at UMMC to adopt 
industry-accepted methodology to help achieve their goals for (CITC) improved operations. Their 
selected format, which is what is used in this project, is the A3 report format, (Appendix C) enhanced 
to include PDSA (plan-do-study-act) components, which consists of an eight step template for 
addressing a problem. This is a variation of the basic A3 Report format template (Appendix A).  
1. The first step is to create an issue statement which is a descriptive title for the report, or what 
is often referred to as a problem statement.  
2. The second step is to form a background synopsis of the problem. This involves identifying 
relevant information which relates the problem to be solved to the broader context of the 
organization and its experience with the issue.  
3. The third step involves explanation of the current condition and includes an iconic diagram 
describing how the process works at present including problem identification labeling and 
data describing the extent of the problem. (Figure 2) 
4. The fourth step is a root cause analysis. This identifies the cause and effect relationship of 
elements which lead to the root of the problem. This cause analysis uses a fish bone diagram 
(Figure 6) which to assign reasons to the four basic elements methods, machine, materials, 
and man.  
5. The fifth component is the target condition which proposes countermeasures to the root 
causes presented (Figure 8) in an iconic diagram describing how the new process will work 
with the proposed changes implemented. This element of the process identifies the goals the 
team has established. 
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6. The sixth element is the implementation plan which defines the steps necessary to 
accomplish the target condition. This includes identifying who will take each action and when.  
7. The seventh element is the follow up plan which defines how and when the user will verify 
that the target condition has been met.  
8. The eighth and final step is identifying results that were achieved as a result of 
implementation.  
 
The A3 Enhanced PDSA template includes a “Follow-up Actions” component that calls for decision 
making on the basis of Accept, Adapt or Abandon regarding a system change based on recorded 
results. Provisions are made for revision of the target model with testing again in the next “Plan-do-
study-act” activity.    
In the remaining document, the results of applying these eight steps are presented. Specifically, 
Chapter 4 provides our analysis of how the current system operates by presenting the results of 
applying steps 1-4. Chapter 5 addresses our design and plan for implementing interventions to 
improve the operating system by presenting our results from applying steps 5-7. Chapter 6 presents 
step 8, the results of our new design. Finally, Chapter 7 presents our overall conclusions and 
recommendations for follow-up actions.  
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Chapter 4: Analysis of How the Current System Operates 
This chapter describes the current manner in which two types of alarms are communicated by 
telemetry in the 3 East Cardiac Unit and the staff response systems in place. An overview of the 
setting and procedures is provided along with an explanation of the steps involved in obtaining 
information, observing the process in place, and meetings conducted to discuss the project. 
Examples of data collected prior to project start are also presented.  A root cause analysis to identify 
elements contributing to the problem is also included in this section.  
Step 3: Current Conditions 
The 3 East floor cardiac unit on the University campus is equipped with 28 beds and is staffed as 
follows: thirty nurses, three unit secretaries, one nurse manager and one nurse educator.  Patients 
are fitted with telemetry packs that monitor a maximum of 24 patients and these units are capable of 
generating three different signals to report on patient status. These signals are not audible in the 
rooms but are sent by wireless transmission in a path illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: 3 East Cardiac Unit Current State Alarm Flowchart 
Of the total number of signals or “alarms” the units send, two conditions, ECG “lead offs” and “no 
signal” (SpO2) are the two most numerous and therefor the most challenging to manage. Currently, 
whenever a lead comes loose from the body or is detached, or the pulse oximeter is removed from 
its site, an alarm is generated and displayed on the Patient Information Center (PIC) at the central 
station in the unit. The alarm is also paged to the nurse and PCA assigned to the patient. If after three 
minutes the alarm condition is not resolved in some way, a reminder alarm will be generated and 
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sent to the same three locations. Reminder alarms will continue to be generated every three minutes 
until the alarm has either been silenced at the PIC or the condition has been resolved.  
The current process is an open system, meaning there is no one individual responsible for answering 
the alarm. If a nurse or PCA sees an alarm displayed on the PIC they may assume the patient’s 
assigned nurse or PCA would be addressing the situation. Also because both the nurse and PCA 
assigned to the patient receive a text notification on their cell phone each could think the other was 
taking action. Both types of alarms are also green or in-ops alarms so they are on the lowest priority 
in comparison to the other alarms monitored through the telemetry system.  
In the daily activities that nurses and PCAs perform, there may be times when the ECG leads or pulse 
oximeter are intentionally removed from the patient. Therefore, alarms for these two conditions will 
be generated even though the nurse purposefully removed them. When a healthcare provider is in 
the room with a patient, generation of alarms is not necessary because the provider is there to 
address any situations or observe conditions. Although the provider is with the patient, alarms are 
still being generated at the central station. This is unnecessary noise and information that will not be 
used because if they are already tending to this patient, it is unnecessary for an alarm to sound.   
Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude of the problem for the University Campus at large represented by 
paged “reminder” alarms for the two types (ECG Leads off and oximeter No Signal) tracked in this 
project. For this 3 month period, “reminder” alarms for these two conditions, columns 2 and 4 from 
the left in Figure 3, totaled 81,769 or nearly 26% of the total of all 317,966 of the top ten telemetry 
paged alarms.   
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  Figure 3: University Campus Top 10 Telemetry Paged Alarm Types 
 
Figure 4 shows the Top Ten Paged Alarm counts from the same time period for the 3 East Cardiac 
unit.  In this case, the “reminder” alarms for ECG “leads Off” (first column on left) and oximeter “No 
signal” (fifth column from left) totaled 11,496 or 29% of the total of all 39,457 Top Ten alarms for this 
unit. It is clear that reducing the number of reminder alarms that contribute to noise and alarm 
fatigue could be beneficial to the operations of this unit and that proportionally they represent a 
large target.    
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Figure 4: 3 East Cardiac Unit Top 10 Paged Alarms 
 
Step 4: Root Cause Analysis   
To understand the daily initiation of all alarms that sound in this unit, and how staff responds to the 
notification, observation was conducted in the 3 East Cardiac telemetry unit. Data were collected 
from the Philips Intellispace Management system, but the system only records alarms paged to the 
cellular phones of nurses and PCAs.  Several days’ worth of observations done in September of 2012 
recorded how staff responded to (or ignored) the alarms. These observations revealed how little 
attention was given to the central monitoring system, except in the event of a red alarm incident. It 
also showed how nurses would silence alarms for all patients when they did go to the Patient 
Information Center if they knew the condition was false, regardless of whether or not the patient 
was assigned to them. Observation also included collection of all alarms events, even those that are 
not captured through the Intellispace system, to more accurately predict the number of alarms 
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generated in the unit.  In total, close to ten hours of observation in the unit were completed. Figure 5 
below illustrates that in this data collection exercise the ECG leads off alarm condition occurred most 
often.  (Observational Worksheet 3 East UM Appendix E) 
 
Figure 5: 3 East Observation Top 10 Alarms 
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A Gemba walk is a lean tool used to observe the workplace without interrupting the workflow. The 
intent is to observe employees and the workplace in order to learn the routines and determine 
where value is added, or not, within the system.  A Gemba walk was done during the observation 
period on 3 East with particular focus on response to alarms. From this, knowledge of how nurses 
and PCAs interact with each other relative to alarms was gained. Some alarms were paged to only 
nurses and not their corresponding PCA, while others were sent to both. On occasion nurses would 
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would only use the patient information center (PIC) when it was convenient, and did not routinely 
exhibit the behavior of viewing or silencing the alarms.  
Root Cause Meeting 
On October 24, 2012 an A3 meeting regarding the ECG “leads off” and SpO2 “no signal” alarms was 
held. The meeting included Mary Buttitta (nurse manager for 3 East), Lori Pellitier (Director of 
Performance Improvement), Terri Crofts (Director of Clinical Engineering), and Rob Beatty 
(Biomedical Engineer), as well as various nurses and PCAs who contributed as they passed through 
the meeting area. The goal of this meeting was to use the data collected to create the fish bone 
diagram, Figure 6, to capture the root cause analysis for the multitude of ECG “leads off” and SpO2 
“no signal” alarms in the 3 East Cardiac unit. The fish bone diagram was drawn on a large sheet of 
blank paper and placed on the wall in front of the group. Four categories of possible causes: man, 
machine, materials, and methods, were labeled as shown in Figure 6, which provided a framework 
for the discussion. Over the course of an hour or more the diagram was filled with potential root 
causes for the targeted alarms with input coming from all participants. The next step was to design 
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potential countermeasures and research their feasibility.                                   
From July to September on 3 East, there were
1068 “ECG Leads Off” alarms (12/day)and 8951
“ECG Leads Off” Reminders (101/day) totaling
10,559 alarms in 89 days
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Figure 6: Fishbone Diagram 
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Chapter 5: Design of a New System 
 
This chapter covers the selection of the countermeasures for the root causes of ECG “leads off” and 
SpO2 “no signal” alarms. The timeline and procedure for implementation are also explained.  
Target Condition 
After the A3 meeting was conducted it was evident that there was no single cause for the number of 
ECG “leads off” and SpO2 “no signal” alarms. Countermeasures to address each cause were discussed 
during the meeting but their feasibility was not determined. The first step of designing the new 
system began with investigation of the limitations and capabilities of the resources available to this 
department within the UMMHC facility.  
The first countermeasure I pursued, shown in Figure 7, was the possibility of purchasing a new or 
upgrading the current telemetry system to allow for stand-by mode to be achieved through the 
telemetry pack in the patient rooms. 
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Countermeasure Implemented Reasoning Alternative 
Consider new or 
upgrading 
telemetry system 
to allow standby 
mode 
No Stand-by mode not possible 
with equipment due to patient 
safety considerations, no 
budget approved 
-- 
Change location of 
telemetry pack on 
patient to reduce 
chance of 
disconnection 
No Other units in hospital have 
tried varying locations without 
success 
-- 
Re-evaluate 
brands of 
electrodes and 
adhesives to 
determine if 
better products 
are available 
No Budgetary; bound to current 
equipment through contract 
-- 
Removal of 
Patient Care 
Assistants from 
receiving alarm 
pages 
Yes Places responsibility on nurses 
to delegate tasks to PCA; 
creates closed loop 
-- 
Make it possible 
for telemetry 
packs to be placed 
on standby mode 
remotely 
No Functionality does not exist for 
remote standby condition due 
to patient safety reasons 
Suspension of 
alarms for 1, 2, 
or 3 minutes by 
nurse/PCA 
through 
telemetry pack 
in patient room 
Figure 7: Table of Considered Countermeasures 
A meeting with Joseph J. Frassica, Vice President and Chief Medical Informatics Officer/ Chief 
Technology Officer for Philips Healthcare was held on November 30, 2012 to inquire about the 
capabilities of the telemetry system. At this meeting Joseph J. Frassica shared that there is no 
method to initiate stand-by mode in any models of Philips telemetry. The reasoning behind this is 
that if a patient were to accidentally activate this feature they could unintentionally remove 
themselves from monitoring, thus leaving healthcare providers blind to their condition. Fortunately, 
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the functionality of alarm suspension was discovered at this meeting. If the settings are adjusted at 
the PIC, pressing both buttons on the telemetry pack can suspend alarms for one, two, or three 
minutes.   
On December 18, 2012 a meeting with Nancy Dejesus, the Clinical Resource Manager at 
UMMHC was held to determine the possibility of the countermeasure of re-evaluating the quality of 
electrodes and adhesives as well as SpO2 sensors. UMMHC currently uses electrode leads and 
adhesives from Covidien through a contract which was developed to save the health center money. 
In the past other brands of electrode lead sets have been used. The switch to Covidien was made to 
reduce costs but not necessarily to increase quality. Discussion with Nancy Dejesus led to the 
conclusion that changing electrode lead sets and/or adhesives would not be possible for the time 
being due to budgetary reasons. In reference to SpO2 sensors, the hospital is already utilizing 
multiple styles of sensors, none of which have been reported to work better than another. 
 After gathering information regarding these two countermeasures, a meeting with Mary 
Buttitta was planned to determine which countermeasures would be implemented. At this meeting 
the re-evaluation of quality of electrodes and the SpO2 sensors was taken off the table, as was the 
evaluation of location of telemetry packs because nurse’s reported none of the locations seemed to 
work better than another.  
The two countermeasures which were proposed for implementation were the utilization of the alarm 
suspension functionality and the removal of PCAs from receiving ECG “leads off” and SpO2 “no 
sensor” alarms. PCAs no longer receiving these two alarms on their cellular telephones created a 
closed loop. With only the nurses receiving these pages, Figure 8, they would have to delegate the 
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task to their PCA directly, if they decided not to respond directly themselves and not rely on the 
assumption that PCAs were addressing the alarms.  
 
Figure 8:  3 East Cardiac Unit Target Alarm Flowchart 
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Before implementing the utilization of the alarm suspension functionality it was important to design 
how the function would work. With the help of Rob Beatty, biomedical engineering technician at 
UMMHC, testing of the functionality was conducted. It was decided that the unit would suspend 
alarms for two minutes, and potentially change to one minute or three minutes depending on 
nurses’ feedback. 
Implementation Plan 
The implementation plan was to first inform and educate the staff on 3 East of the changes that 
would be made, and then one week later begin using the new system. On January 14, 2013 Mary 
Buttitta issued a staff newsletter explaining the functionality of the telemetry packs to suspend 
alarms, as well as notice that the PCAs would no longer be receiving pages for ECG “leads off” or 
SpO2 “no sensor” alarms. During the following week the staff continued work as normal and on 
January 21, 2013 the new design of work-flow was implemented.  
Follow-Up 
The changes agreed to were properly implemented and routine weekly visits to the 3 East unit were 
conducted. During these visits staff members were interviewed and observations were recorded. 
Notes on these observations are located in Appendix F: 3 East Unit Observations- Post Re-design and 
discussed in Chapter 7 Conclusion section. 
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Chapter 6: Results of the System Re-design 
This chapter presents the data that was collected during three initial two week periods 
compared with data from two separate two week periods preceding the implementation of the 
new procedure. 
Results 
23 alarm conditions were recorded in 3 East Telemetry Unit during five separate two week 
periods December 24, 2012 through January 6, 2013, January 7, 2013 through January 20, 2013, 
January 28, 2013 through February 10, 2013, February 11, 2013 through February 24, 2013, and 
February 25, 2013 through March 10, 2013.  The total number of the 23 paged alarm conditions 
for each of the two week periods is represented in Figure 9. The total number of alarms for the 
periods before the implementation of the new design is 9601 and 8022.  After the change the 
number of alarms for the three periods is 17106, 6977, and 6890. As can be seen in Figure 9 the 
number of alarms during the January 28, 2013 through February 10, 2013 period is 
disproportionately large in comparison to the other two week periods. The reason for this was 
a disruption in the alarm pages due to an upgrade to the nurses’ and PCAs’ cellular phones. 
During that particular two week period new phones were issued, but a software issue 
prevented many of the pages from actually being sent to the phones. While the alarms were 
being generated the nurses and PCAs were not receiving all of them and therefore not tending 
to them, causing more alarms to be generated. This was a problem outside of this project.  
Aside from the troublesome two week period, it can be seen the total number of alarms has 
decreased post implementation of the new design. The ratio of original to reminder also 
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decreased, prior to implementation that ratio was 1:1.4 and post implementation it decreased 
to 1:0.8  which is nearly a 50% decrease.   
 
Figure 9: 3 East Cardiac Unit Paged Alarms 
In regards to the ECG “leads off” and SpO2 ”no signal” alarms Figure 10 and Figure 11 display 
the amount of alarms for the various two week periods.  The total number of “leads off” and 
“no signal” alarms can be expressed as a ratio of initial alarm to reminder alarm. This ratio was 
1:8 for the SpO2 “no signal” alarms pre-implementation meaning that for each initial “no signal” 
alarm condition paged, 8 subsequent reminder alarms were paged.  Reminder alarms continue 
to be paged until a caregiver silences the alarm at the central station. For the ECG “leads off” 
alarm condition the ratio was 1:6 or 6 reminder alarms paged for each initial paged alarm 
condition.  Because the changes were made on January 21, 2013 data was not collected for 
analysis the week following the change to allow the staff time to adjust to the new system. In 
this period there were 6977 alarms, a reduction of 1045 or 12%. In comparison between the 
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weeks of January 7, 2013 through January 20, 2013 and January 28, 2013 through February 10, 
2013; of the 1045 decrease in total alarms, 271 were ECG “leads off” and SpO2 “no signal” 
alarms. This represents a 38% reduction attributable to these two specific alarm types.  
 
Figure 10: 3 East Cardiac Unit Paged ECG “Leads Off” Alarms 
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Figure 11: 3 East Cardiac Unit Paged SpO2 “No Signal” Alarms 
The data from the period shows a reduction in the ratio of initial alarms to reminder alarms for 
the SpO2 “no signal alarms” condition. For the 79 initial alarms generated in the January 7, 2013 
through January 20, 2013 data sample there were 591 reminder alarms, a ratio of 1:8.  In the 
February 11, 2013 through February 24, 2013 period there were 74 initial alarms generated but 
only 392 reminders, a ratio of 1:5 ratio.  This means that for every SpO2 “no signal” alarm there 
were three fewer reminder alarms generated an elimination of 222 alarms.  
The reduction of 1045 paged alarms between the two periods referenced resulted in a 13% reduction 
in paged alarms.  These figures do not completely measure the total impact of the change in overall 
alarm generation for the following reason. Not all alarm conditions are paged. Therefore, the new 
practice of suspending alarm generation when caregivers are attending patients with telemetry packs 
results in fewer alarms being generated in total; those paged and those alarms that are generated 
but not paged. There is no way to measure this number. 
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Analysis of new data  
  
Data collected in the healthcare environment is subject to a large amount of variability owing to a 
variety of factors.  Such factors include changes in the patient population numbers, health conditions 
of the patients, changes in staffing levels or personnel, implementation of new policies or 
procedures, introduction of new equipment, and a number of other factors that may not be obvious 
in their contribution.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Recommendations  
Follow Up Meetings  
 
A meeting with Mary Buttitta was held on April 11, 2013 to share the data collected and analyzed 
during the five separate two week periods. Mary expressed the positive reaction from the nurses 
regarding the new capability to suspend the alarms from the rooms; they are glad to no longer 
receive pages from a monitored patient to whom they are currently providing assistance. She also 
shared that the nurses did not like the new responsibility of delegating the SpO2 “no signal” and ECG 
“leads off” alarms to the PCAs. They found the additional step in their day-to-day work flow to be an 
added burden. Mary though is pleased with the change because legally it is the nurses' responsibility 
to be held accountable for these alarms. 
On the same day a meeting with Terri Crofts was held to share the same data collected and relay 
Mary’s input. Terri was also pleased with the results and plans to share them with the executive 
steering committee that chartered this project in hopes of implementing these countermeasures in 
more units throughout UMMHC. 
 
Conclusions  
  
This project demonstrated that using the lean process to address a complex problem in the 
healthcare industry can be successful and that potential solutions to a problem may be present 
without being obvious. When the root cause analysis for the large number of reminder alarms 
was being conducted, it was not clear that an alternative use of existing equipment could help 
alleviate nuisance alarms from being generated. Verification that there was an open loop 
system with no clear accountability helped identify a contributor to the problem experienced in 
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the current state. The eight step A3 Report process, which included bringing multiple 
perspectives together to detail all aspects of the current state, allows a design change to be 
formulated based on facts and observations rather than the outcome of a brainstorming 
session. The process followed did not rely on assumptions so there was an opportunity to ask 
many questions, observe, and identify details that proved to be significant. As major discovery 
of this MQP project was that features of the existing equipment in the studied telemetry unit 
could be used to reduce nuisance alarms and potentially help mitigate alarm fatigue.  
The project also validated the importance of having a champion, because there was one for this 
MQP, access to the necessary resources was never a problem. No higher level of authority was 
required to make the modest changes that were part of the target design. Although some of 
staff are less enthusiastic about the new closed loop system for response to the alarm 
conditions focused on in this project, the benefits are consistent with the institution’s mission 
statement.   
Although the target design did not result in the same rate of change for both alarm conditions that 
were targeted, it did result in a significant reduction in overall alarms for the unit studied. More 
investigation or further tracking over time would be necessary to explain or understand why the 
targeted alarm results differed. The results show that by detailed analysis and observation 
improvements to a process can be made without having to spend money or make major changes. 
The data collected in this project suggest that there may be potential benefits for other departments 
experiencing high rates of nuisance alarms. The experience of this MQP may provide the basis for 
future projects in other departments at UMMHC.          
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Appendix B:  UMMC Policy Process Improvement Charter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Project Information 
Leadership 
Executive Steering 
Committee: 
 
 
Project Sponsors: 
-Clinical Engineering 
-Quality and Patient Safety 
-Risk Mgmt  
Does this have to be people? 
 
Process Owner: 
Jeffrey Peterson 
Process Purpose 
Participant/Process 
Team members and Dept : 
•Name – Dept                                
•Name – Dept     
•Name – Dept 
•Name – Dept 
•Name – Dept 
•patient 
Process Scope: Start/Stop 
Start: 
•Alarm condition is generated 
by the physiological monitor. 
 
Stop: 
•
Process Scope: In/Out 
In Scope: 
Distribution methods, human factors, 
answering process and parameters for alarms 
from bedside monitors, telemetry monitors, 
central stations, and Emergin (cell phones and 
signs). 
 
Project Goals 
Goals/Key Measures: 
FY 2012 Goals: 
•Decrease the total number of 
false critical alarms generated by 
XX% (goal under discussion) 
•Decrease the total number of 
non-actionable nuisance and 
false alarms by XX% 
•Create a standard 
recommended response time for 
answering alarms for different 
settings and alarm types 
 
•Increase caregiver trust in the 
validity of the alarms generated 
•Increase regulatory compliance 
with TJC and Clinical Alarms 
System Policy 
•Increase patient satisfaction 
(HCAHPS) by improving the 
environment of care 
 
 
Problems/Case for Change 
 
 
 
 
Project Time Frame  
•Planning Meeting #1 – date 
•
Planning Meeting #2 – date 
•Planning Meeting #3 –  date 
•Value Stream Mapping Sessions: date 
•Follow up meeting  #1 
•Follow up meeting  #2 
•Follow up meeting  #3  
 
 
Determine project timeframe and milestones 
 
Milestone/Date 
Process Improvement Charter: Clinical Alarm Management and Distribution 
Last Update: 5/16/2012 Charter Owners: (name of Project Sponsor) 
Patient monitoring systems 
measure physiological 
parameters. When a problem 
arises with the patient’s 
condition, it is the monitor’s job to 
alarm in order to alert caregivers 
of the situation. 
•High percentage of nuisance alarms and false alarms 
and a low percentage of “actionable” alarms is creating 
alarm fatigue and alarm desensitization. 
•Severely decreased caregiver trust in the alarm 
system. 
•Limited parameter and source distinction between 
alarm sounds and/or visual displays. 
•Alarm fatigue has led to several adverse events. Voice of the Patient 
•High noise levels due to excessive alarms make resting 
and sleeping very difficult. 
•Burden of nuisance and false alarms on the staff slows 
response times to both real alarms and nurse calls. 
•Unanswered alarms creates anxiety for the associated 
patient. 
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Appendix C:  UMMHC CITC, A3 Enhanced PDSA template   
 
Project Title:   Date:  
Lead:                                   Page:  
 
Team Members: 
 
Problem Statement:  
 
Scope (In/Out):   
 
Background/Current Conditions: 
 
Root Causes: 
 
(A3) Enhanced PDSA  
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Goals: 
Estimated Project Completion: 
 
 
Plan  ∙  Do  ∙  Study  ∙ Act  (PDSA) 
Countermeasures (Plan): 
 
 
 
 
Implementation (Do): 
 
 
 
Results/Conclusion (Study): 
 
 
 
Follow-up Actions (Act): 
 
 
 
  
 
1. Include title and date in the header 
2. List team members. Identify Leader(s). 
3. Problem Statement: Briefly state the problem. i.e. simply; Meetings consistently start late. 
i.e. clinically; "High abandonment rate (averaging 31.9% weekly over the past 4.5 months) of 
patients and providers calling the Cardiology clinic number (3452), is causing patient and 
staff dissatisfaction.” 
4. Scope (In/Out): Define limits on what is and what is not being included in this analysis. This 
could be departments, patient types, or process paths.  
i.e. Worcester campuses only 
5. Background/Current Conditions: What happens today? Describe the context or history of 
the situation. What is the result of the problem? What is being observed? Who is involved 
or affected (stake-holders)?  What reports or measures are being used to track performance 
in the area? This can include a process map, pictures, or other visual representation. 
i.e. Has been happening for a long time. Organization is meeting heavy. Late meetings 
cause people to be late and/or subsequent meetings to start late. Sample testing shows 
on average 75% of meetings start late.  Average lateness is 7 minutes. 
6. Root Causes: Using tools such as 5 Whys, Fishbone, Pareto Chart, or other graphs explore 
what are the root causes of the symptoms. Sometimes you will need to research data, 
interview staff, or do a Gemba walk. 
i.e. Cannot find parking space, shuttle running late, cannot find room, room is locked, 
waiting for an elevator, ran into colleague in hallway, late from another meeting, etc.  
7. Goals: Describe the results you would like to see addressing the major factors contributing 
to the current condition. Include cost, timing, and impact.  
i.e. Reduce average number of meetings that start late; reduce length of time meetings 
start late; improve productivity by evaluating the overall frequency of meetings, length 
of meetings, and efficiency of meetings towards accomplishing meeting agenda.  
8. Estimated Project Completion: Estimate beginning/ending dates and important milestones. 
i.e. Would like to work on this in the next quarter (April-June, 2010) 
9. Countermeasures (Plan): What do you plan to do at a high level? Every countermeasure is a 
Lean tool.  What waste are you eliminating? What results do you expect to see?  What 
would possibly go wrong? (identify and predict potential failure modes before 
implementing) 
i.e. Standard work for nurse triage or test ordering; Visual board for discharge status; 
Signal for test ordering required or patient ready in waiting room. 
Enhanced PDSA 
Instructions 
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10. Implementation (Do): Describe what actions you are planning to do. Identify steps including 
who is assigned and when it is due.  Carry out the change or test.  
i.e. Develop protocol for meeting agenda contents including format and distribution of 
agenda to attendees 2 days prior to meeting. Expect to see reduction of late meeting 
starts to 25%. Work with HR to develop protocol(Sue). Communicate protocol(Bob). 
11. Results/Conclusion (Study): Collect data and begin analysis. What behaviors did you 
observe? What happened?  What were the challenges? What did you learn? Did you meet 
your measurement goal listed in the countermeasures (show results)? 
i.e. 50% of meetings started late with average late time being 5 minutes.. 
12. Follow-up Actions: (Accept, Adapt, Abandon) Are we ready to make a system change (if so: 
who, what, when, where)? Do we need to make revisions and test again in next PDSA? 
i.e. Expand communication efforts to get the message out. Hold special classes on 
preparing an agenda and meeting effectiveness. Try promoting meeting length being 45 
minutes instead of an hour.  
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Appendix D:  Observational Worksheet 3 East UM 
Alarm Type 
Alarm 
Category 
Classification 
(T/F/N) T Start T Action 
Time 
Silence 
Action 
Taken 
(Y/N) Notification Method Notes 
Brady Red Alarm F 10:51:50 10:51:10 10:52:00 Y     
Brady Red Alarm   2:02:40 2:02:50 2:02:50       
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 1:12:30 --- 1:12:40 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 1:35:00 --- 1:35:20 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 1:35:20 --- 1:35:55 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 1:42:20 --- 1:43:10 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op F --- 10:21:00 10:21:30 Y 
PIIC/Students in room 
observing patient Some ECG alarms off. Artifact in waveform.  
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 10:23:50 --- 10:24:15 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 10:36:50 --- 10:37:15 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 10:49:30 --- 10:50:00 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 11:20:00 --- 11:20:35 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 11:22:15 --- 11:22:50 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 11:40:15 --- 11:41:30 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   11:13:20 --- 11:14:00 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op       11:25:15       
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   11:26:45   11:27:30       
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op       11:30:40     II 
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   11:34:15   11:34:40       
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   12:38:15   12:38:30     II 
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   12:40:00   12:41:30     III 
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   12:40:30   12:40:35       
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   12:44:30   12:44:45       
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   12:48:10           
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op       12:55:45       
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   1:00:20   1:00:40       
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   1:10:05   1:11:50       
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   1:47:00   1:47:05     II 
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   1:48:15   1:48:50     RA L OFF III ECG OFF II CNAECG II 
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   1:55:30           
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op   1:00:00   1:10:00 Y     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 2:01:45   2:02:00 N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N       N     
Cannot 
Analyze ECG In-Op N 2:40:45   2:41:50       
ECG leads OFF In-Op N --- --- 13:10:00 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 12:53:01 --- 12:53:05 N   Alarm turned on and off almost immediately  
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 12:55:20 --- 12:55:30 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 12:56:15 --- 12:56:30 N   
 
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 12:57:00 --- 12:58:00 N   I was told by nurse patient keeps moving 
ECG leads OFF In-Op N   ---   N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N   ---   N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 13:05:10 --- 13:05:30 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 13:05:35 --- 13:05:40 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 1:11:00 --- 1:13:00 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 1:12:40   1:12:50 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 1:26:00 --- 1:26:10 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 10:22:00 10:34:00 10:34:00 Y   Patient finally hooked up 
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 10:23:50 --- 10:23:55 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 10:45:00 --- 10:45:05 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 11:07:35 --- 11:08:30 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 11:27:35 --- 11:27:40 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 11:30:00 --- 11:31:10 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 11:38:35 --- 11:38:40 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 11:39:50 --- 11:40:15 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 11:46:00 ---   N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 11:50:00 --- 11:51:00 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op   11:07:15 --- 11:10:00 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op   11:13:00 --- 11:13:20 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op   11:20:20 --- 11:20:25 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op   11:24:30           
ECG leads OFF In-Op   11:33:00   11:33:40     IIII 
ECG leads OFF In-Op             III 
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ECG leads OFF In-Op   12:46:00         II 
ECG leads OFF In-Op   12:50:30           
ECG leads OFF In-Op   12:54:00 12:57:00 12:57:00 Y   TURNED SOME ECG ALARMS OFF 
ECG leads OFF In-Op   1:00:00   1:05:00       
ECG leads OFF In-Op   1:05:30   1:09:30       
ECG leads OFF In-Op   1:10:00   1:11:50       
ECG leads OFF In-Op             "she is in bath, I don't turn off cause they won't turn back on" 
ECG leads OFF In-Op               
ECG leads OFF In-Op   2:57:15   3:00       
ECG leads OFF In-Op   3:04:15   3:05:50       
ECG leads OFF In-Op N       Y PIIC Patient pulled off. Action taken because nurse told someone I was watching.  
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 1:09:00 1:21:00 2:21:00 Y   PATIENT PUT ON TELE STBY 
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 1:44:45   1:48:00 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 1:45:00   1:45:15 N     
ECG leads OFF In-Op N 2:39:15 2:44:15 2:44:15 Y   PUT ON TELE STBY 
ECG leads OFF In-Op   2:56:30           
ECG leads OFF In-Op   3:10:30   3:10:40       
HR High 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   2:14:00           
HR High 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   2:45:20   2:48:20       
HR High 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   1:17:00   1:20:00       
HR High 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 11:45:30 --- 11:48:30 N     
HR High 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   2:10:45   2:13:50       
HR High 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   10:23:00 --- 10:25:00 N   Self correcting alarm 
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   10:42:30 --- 10:45:00 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:05:15 --- 11:07:00 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:13:20 --- 11:16:00 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:16:30 --- 11:19:15 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   10:50:00 --- 10:51:50 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   10:55:15 --- 10:58:00 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   10:59:00 --- 11:00:30 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:01:00 --- 11:04:45 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:07:30 --- 11:10:00 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:10:20 --- 11:13:00 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:21:30 --- 11:24:30 N     
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:25:40   11:28:20       
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:27:45   11:31:30       
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:31:10   11:34:15       
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate   11:35:30   11:38:30       
HR Low 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 10:58:40 --- 11:00:20 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 10:25:45 --- 10:38:30 Y     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 10:35:00 --- 10:35:30 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 11:03:15 --- 11:04:30 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 11:13:25 --- 11:14:30 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 11:25:25 --- 11:28:00 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 11:36:16 --- 11:36:55 N     
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IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 12:58:38   1:03:00 N   *nurse reviewed ecg traces only 
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 1:08:30   1:19:50 N   *is latching? 
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 1:20:30   1:29:00 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 1:41:45   1:42:10 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 1:53:40   1:55:10 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 2:02:00   2:02:20 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 2:10:50   2:18:18 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 2:22:15   2:30:30 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 2:32:30   2:33:00 N   * talked to nurse. Necessary but annoying because patient has afib and there is no other alarm to signify this event.  
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 2:42:00   2:42:30 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 2:55:00   2:59:30 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 3:02:00   3:02:15 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 3:14:00   3:15:15 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate N 3:24:00   3:25:00 N     
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate T       Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC Nurse was already in patient room  
IRR HR 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Rate T 1:38:20 ---   Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC Nurse was already in patient room  
Leadset 
Unplug In-Op N --- --- --- N     
LL Lead OFF In-Op   3:04   3:06       
Missed Beat  
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Beat 
Detection   2:22:10           
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   12:56:00   12:59:00       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:04:30   1:07:30       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:08:30   1:09:30 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:19:50   1:21:30 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:24:00   1:27:00       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:29:45   1:31:30       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:40:15   1:43:15       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:42:10   1:44:00 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:50:40   1:53:40       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:55:10   1:57:20 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:02:00   2:05:00       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:11:20   2:19:00       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:16:00   2:21:00 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:33:00   2:33:30 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:46:00   2:49:00 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:47:00   2:50:00       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 3:02:15   3:05:15 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   3:05:00   3:08:00       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi N 10:40:00 --- 10:43:00 N     
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a – PVCs 
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:11:15 --- 11:12:40 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:14:00 --- 11:16:30 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:15:40 --- 11:18:15 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:26:00 --- 11:29:30 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:27:40 --- 11:30:50 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   --- --- 10:43:00 N 
  
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   10:45:30 --- 10:46:15 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   10:56:10 --- --- N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   11:10:10 --- 11:13:15 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   11:20:20 --- 11:23:20 N     
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   12:45:00   12:48:00       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   12:58:40   1:01:20       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:13:15   1:16:00       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:26:30   1:29:30       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:26:30   1:29:30       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:38:00   1:41:00       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:50:30   1:53:30       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs               
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:56   2:59       
Multi PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:57:15   3:00:15       
Multiform 
PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T 12:57:00 --- --- N   Escalated 
Multiform 
PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T 13:08:00 --- 13:11:00 N     
Multiform 
PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T 1:14:00 --- 1:14:40 N     
Multiform 
PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T 1:25:00 --- 1:25:20 N     
NBP High 
Yellow - 
NBP   2:06:20 2:06:45 2:06:45 Y   alarm sus. Sp02 off. All alarms off.  
NBP Int 
Yellow - 
NBP   11:05:00 --- --- N     
NBP Int 
Yellow - 
NBP   3:04:30           
NBP Int 
Yellow - 
NBP N             
NBP Int 
Yellow - 
NBP   3:05:00           
No Signal In-Op N 13:00:00 --- 13:13:00 N   Finally hooked patient up and alarm turned itself off.  
No Signal In-Op N 11:19:45 --- 11:20:00 N     
No Signal In-Op   12:48:00   12:48:05     I 
No Signal In-Op   1:08:30   1:09:15       
No Signal In-Op   1:20:00           
No Signal In-Op   3:05:50           
No Signal In-Op   3:18           
No Signal In-Op N 1:45:15   2:00:00 N     
No Signal In-Op N 2:08:00   2:08:30 N     
Non Sus. VT 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T 12:54:00 --- 12:57:00 N   Alarm Time Out 
Non Sus. VT 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T 1:15:00 ---   N     
Non Sus. VT 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 10:53:40 --- 10:55:40 N     
Non Sus. VT 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:06:30 --- 11:08:00 N     
Non Sus. VT 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi   1:05:30   1:08:30       
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a – PVCs 
Non Sus. VT 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:18:00   1:21:00       
Non Sus. VT 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:25:15   1:28:15       
Non Sus. VT 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:30:30   2:32:30 N     
Non Sus. VT 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 3:00:00   3:02:00 N     
Non Sus. VT 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   3:09:45   3:12:45       
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs F 10:27:30 10:34:15 10:30:00 Y   Nurse did ECG review, and told me its giving that error because of the PVCs.  
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 10:44:00 --- 10:46:00 N     
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:04:30 --- 11:06:30 N     
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:14:30 --- 11:17:00 N     
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:28:00 --- 11:30:00 N     
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:34:45 --- 11:36:15 N     
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:36:55 --- 11:38:30 N     
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:39:40 --- 11:42:40 N     
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:42:00 --- 11:45:00 N     
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   3:26:15           
Pacer not 
Capture 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:39:50 --- 1:41:30 N     
PACER NOT 
PACE   N 11:32:30 --- 11:35:30 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T 12:57:10 --- 13:00:10 N   Alarm Time Out 
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T 13:02:00 --- 13:05:00 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T 1:10:00 --- 1:12:30 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T 10:25:55 --- 10:27:30 Y     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 10:32:15 --- 10:35:00 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 10:35:30 --- 10:38:10 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 10:48:50 --- 10:50:30 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 10:50:30 --- 10:54:15 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 10:56:00 --- 10:59:00 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:10:50 11:11:00 11:12:30 Y     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:48:00 --- 11:51:00 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:52:00 ---   N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   10:46:15 --- 10:49:45 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   10:50:45 --- 10:52:30 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   11:19:20 --- 11:22:30 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   12:38:30   12:42:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   12:42:45 12:45:00 12:45:20 Y PAGED  CNAECG I RA II 
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   12:44:20   12:47:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   12:45:15   12:48       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   12:50:25   12:53:10       
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Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:05:00   1:08:05       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:05:50   1:08:50       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:33:00   1:36:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:42:00   1:45:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:46:00   1:49:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:47:45   1:51:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:55:00   1:58:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:15:00           
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:03:15   2:06:15       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:08:00   2:11:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:12:00   2:15:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:12:30   2:15:30       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:12:50           
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:45:00   2:48:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:51:30   2:54:30       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:54:30   2:57:30       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   3:07   3:10       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:05:00   1:08:00       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:09:30   1:12:30 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:33:45   1:36:40       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:58:20   2:02:00 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:02:20   2:05:20 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:08:00   2:13:45       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:24:45   2:28:30       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:42:30   2:45:30 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:52:30   2:55:00 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:59:30   3:00:00 N     
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   3:02:45   3:05:45       
Pair PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 3:06:30   3:09:45 N     
Pause 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Beat 
Detection N 10:58:30 --- 10:58:40 N     
Pause 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - Beat 
Detection   1:54:00   2:18:00       
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs T       Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC Nurse was already in patient room  
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 12:55:56   12:59:00 N   *PATIENT IN 310B HAS A-FIB SO ANY ALARM THAT WENT OFF INDICATING IRREGULAR RHYTHM WAS ESSENTIALLY A NUISSANCE. 
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:19:10   1:22:00       
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:31:30   1:33:40 N     
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:44:00   1:47:00 N     
PVCS >10/MIN Yellow   1:57:15   2:00:15       
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Arrhythmi
a – PVCs 
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:57:20   1:58:20 N     
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   2:08:00   2:11:00       
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:08:00   2:11:20 N     
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:18:15   2:24:45 N     
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:33:30     N     
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 2:50:30   2:52:30 N     
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 3:15:15   3:18:15 N     
PVCS >10/MIN 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 3:25:00   3:28:00 N     
RA Lead Off In-Op   10:58:00 --- 10:58:15 N     
RA Lead Off In-Op   11:06:00 --- 11:07:00 N     
RA Lead Off In-Op   11:07:15 --- 11:19:20 N   There was an alarm that was greater whose noise over powered this. When that alarm timed out, this one resumed till 11:24:30. 
RA Lead Off In-Op   11:26:45   11:28:30       
RA Lead Off In-Op   11:28:00         III 
RA Lead Off In-Op   12:38:00   12:38:15   I II 
RA Lead Off In-Op   12:45:30   12:45:35       
RA Lead Off In-Op   12:59:00   12:59:20       
RA Lead Off In-Op   1:03:00   1:03:05       
RA Lead Off In-Op   2:51:00   2:51:01       
RA Lead Off In-Op N 2:05:30     N     
R-ON-T PVC 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 11:22:45 --- 11:25:25 N     
R-ON-T PVC 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs   1:43:50   1:46:50       
Run PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 10:55:40 --- 10:57:45 N     
Run PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:33:40   1:36:40 N     
Run PVCs 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 1:48:50   1:51:50 N     
SPO2 No 
Sensor In-Op N --- --- 13:10:00 N   Alarm type not silenced 
Tachy Red Alarm T 1:27:10 2:27:15 1:27:35 Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC  Prints ECG, Nurses reviewed arrhythmia. Nurse went into patient room.  
Tachy Red Alarm T 1:29:50 1:30:00 1:39:20 Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC Nurse was already in patient room / silenced by another nurse (who also went to check if the nurse needed help) 
Tachy Red Alarm T 1:30:40 1:30:40 1:30:45 Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC Nurse was already in patient room  
Tachy Red Alarm T 1:34:00 1:34:00 1:34:20 Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC Nurse was already in patient room  
Tachy Red Alarm T 1:38:25 1:38:25 1:38:30 Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC Nurse was already in patient room  
Tachy Red Alarm T 1:40:00 1:40:00 1:41:30 Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC Nurse was already in patient room  
Tachy Red Alarm T 1:42:05 1:42:05 1:42:22 Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC Nurse was already in patient room  
Tachy Red Alarm T       Y 
1st alarm sound, 
second check PIIC Nurse was already in patient room  
V-Fib/Tach Red Alarm   3:05:15 3:05:30 3:05:45 Y     
V-Tach Red Alarm F 2:21:00 2:22:20 2:22:20 Y   ecg review.  
Vent Rhythm 
Yellow 
Arrhythmi
a - PVCs N 10:57:45 --- 10:58:40 N     
V-Fib/Tach Red Alarm   12:50:00 12:50:20 12:50:20       
V-Tach Red Alarm F 10:40:40 10:41:30 10:41:00 Y     
V-Tach Red Alarm F 2:36:40 2:36:50 2:36:50 Y PIIC review ECG 
V-Tach Red Alarm F 2:37:40 2:37:50 2:37:50 Y PIIC review ECG 
V-Tach Red Alarm F 2:37:50 2:38:00 2:38:00 Y PIIC review ECG 
 
Appendix E:  Indications for Telemetry Monitoring   
Indications for Telemetry Monitoring 
 
DIAGNOSIS 
 
UTILIZATION 
RECOMMENDATION GUIDELINE FOR 
DISCONTINUING TELEMETRY 
 Pacemaker Insertion or 
Adjustment 
 
Suspicion of Pacemaker  
Dysfunction 
 -  Successful implantation or 
adjustment of pacemaker with no 
observed malfunctioning X 24 – 48 
hours 
Resuscitation from cardiac 
arrest 
 -until ICD is placed 
- unless secondary to drug effect and 
arrhythmia resolves monitor 12 hours 
thereafter 
High risk lesions at cardiac 
cath 
 -24 hours after intervention  
(ie left Main or equivalent) 
Non-urgent PCI with 
complications 
 -24 hours 
AV block Mobitz II or higher  -Continuous until permanent 
pacemaker unless secondary to drug 
effect and arrhythmia resolves monitor 
12 hours thereafter 
Post cardiac surgery  -48-72 hours 
Rule Out Myocardial 
Infarction 
(Low Risk) 
Normal EKG upon admit with 
chest pain 
No previous history of angina 
or MI 
-  D/C monitor if 3 negative CPKs or 
negative troponins with no 12 lead EKG 
changes  
 
Rule Out Myocardial 
Infarction 
(High Risk) 
History of MI, known CAD, 
past CABG 
Diabetes, Elderly 
-  D/C if all serial CPKs and troponins are 
within normal limits and 12 lead EKGs 
without changes over 24 hours 
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 12 Lead EKG with changes or 
questionable changes 
-  Successful management of pain, 
medication and patient ruled out by 
enzymes and 12 lead EKG 
- Monitor patient with activity, if no 
problem then D/C 
Status post Myocardial 
Infarction 
- history of VT/V fib only in 24 
– 48 hour period in the setting 
(without further events) of an 
MI 
-  NO observed arrhythmia and no chest 
pain for 48 - 72 hours after MI 
-  24 – 48 hours after transfer out of ICU 
Acute Coronary 
Syndromes (unstable 
angina) 
 -  pain free x 24 – 48 hours 
Congestive Heart 
Failure 
Presents with angina 
New diagnosis of failure with 
suspected angina/MI 
Evidence of existing 
arrhythmia requiring 
management 
Telemetry not indicated if: 
-  patients with known failure 
who do NOT have issues listed 
under the CHF definition on 
the left UNLESS potassium 
levels <3.5or >5.5 or excessive 
diuresis is evident 
-  Rule out MI by enzymes and 
appropriate cardiac markers (24 hours) 
-  Heart failure determined not to be 
related to ischemia 
-  No observed significant arrhythmias 
for 24 hours or successful management 
of any existing arrhythmias 
-  Stable potassium levels with diuresis 
(2 successive blood draws 12 hours 
apart)  
Atrial Fibrillation 
New onset or rapid rate 
 
 
Anti Arrhythmic Treatment 
-  Monitor for pro-arrhythmia 
while loading antiarrhythmic 
 
Telemetry not indicated if: 
-  this is a chronic condition, 
rate is controlled, and patient 
is asymptomatic 
 
-  Successful rate control (for 12-24 
hours) with no plans for cardioversion 
(chemical or electrical) 
-  Successful cardioversion with no 
reconversion to afib after 24 hours 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION GUIDELINE FOR 
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DIAGNOSIS 
UTILIZATION 
DISCONTINUING TELEMETRY 
 Blunt Traumatic Cardiac 
Injury 
Telemetry indicated for: 
-patient who presents with 
abnormal EKG or injury 
consistent with cardiac 
contusion 
 
-  NO observes arrhythmia x 24 hours 
Electrolyte Imbalances Telemetry should be used:  
- potassium is <3.2 or 
>5.5 (unless baseline 
for renal failure 
patients)  
- potassium infusion 
>10-20 mEq/hr 
- Mg + + <  1.5 
       -      Ca + +  < 8.0  
       -      Ca + + > 11 
- Resolution of electrolyte 
imbalance 
 
Syncope Telemetry indicated x 48 
hours 
-  Day 3:  telemetry may be 
discontinued if arrhythmic causes have 
been ruled out 
Arrhythmia Management 
SVT/Bradycardia 
 
Unstable rhythm abnormality 
or conduction disturbance 
Telemetry indicated  24 – 48 
hours in patients presenting 
with arrhythmia 
Return of NSR or NO evidence of 
arrhythmias x 48 hours 
VT Telemetry indicated  24 to 48 
hours 
At the discretion of attending MD 
Drug Toxicity  Telemetry indicated 24 - 48 
hours – dependent on drug 
half life. 
Blood levels are within normal range or 
risk of cardiac arrhythmia has been 
ruled out. 
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Prolonged QT with associated 
Ventricular arrhythmia 
 Continuous until definitive therapy 
 
 
DIAGNOSIS 
 
UTILIZATION 
RECOMMENDATION GUIDELINE FOR 
DISCONTINUING TELEMETRY 
Post operative patients with 
sleep apnea   
If pt is receiving continuous 
pulse oximetry 
24-48 hours 
Percutaneous coronary artery 
intervention (PCI) 
 24 hours 
Other Conditions when 
justified: 
 
Thyrotoxic Crisis with 
Tachycardia 
 
 
 
 -24 hours then remove 
 
TIA 
CVA 
 Recommending 48 hours of continuous 
telemetry monitoring with initiation 
when patient is placed on ED monitor 
Adult Guidelines for IV 
medications 
 As defined by pharmacy protocols 
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Appendix F: 3 East Unit Observations- Post Re-Design 
 
 Nurses/PCAs were notified of changes through flyers posted around unit, emails, 
and at staff meetings 
 Nurses expressed annoyance of having to contact PCAs for alarms 
 PCAs said this was a benefit- now know which alarms there are responsible for and 
have to address immediately 
 PCAs are would like to be able to use the alarm suspension feature as well  
o Currently only nurses use permitted to use this function 
o They are typically responsible for bathing and assisting patients, as well as 
changing lead sets 
 would be convenient to be able to silence alarms while doing this, 
especially with ECG 
 Nurses said it took them a while to remember to inform PCAs of ECG and SpO2 
alarms because it was a change in work flow 
o Not a difficult adjustment, just too  time to get used to 
 Nurses like suspending alarms in rooms when they are assisting patients and they 
know alarms will be generated 
o Helping a patient stand-up and practice walking 
o Administering specific medicines 
o Re-applying electrode adhesives 
